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if provided for by statute and if the spouse seeking the decree is innocent of any wrongdoing, although they may have resided together
under the same roof throughout the period. The ground of mental
cruelty is predicated upon a repetition of less serious acts by the guilty
spouse combined with a course of marital unkindness other than physical violence, the cumulative effect of which is to make impossible
the continuance of cohabitation by the spouses. 15 Denial of reasonable
marital intercourse can be charged and a divorce granted though the
parties at all times remained living under the same roof and in a
sense cohabited together. Although by the weight of authority desertion usually means a cessation of cohabitation with an intent to
abandon, if one spouse by his or her misconduct gives the other justifiable cause for leaving then this conduct amounts to a constructive
desertion though the one charged therewith does not actually leave. 16
It is urged that the better view holds with the Kentucky court and
the majority of jurisdictions in not allowing an absolute divorce under
this type of statute where the parties live together in the same dwelling.
JAMEs F. HOGE

EVIDENCE: ADMISSIBILITY OF UNCOMMUNICATED
THREATS OF A DECEASED PERSON -GRIFFIN v.
UNITED STATES
It is entirely probable that in more than half the cases of prosecu-

tion for murder which have arisen in our courts, a plea of self-defense
has been presented by the accused. Suppose there is some evidence
of acts on the part of the deceased in this situation which might have
justified the attack by the defendant? Should evidence of an uncommunicated threat by the deceased be admitted by the court, where it
can be shown that the deceased did some act, even though circumstantial, which indicates that he may have been the aggressor?
This specific question confronted the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the comparatively recent
103 Cal. App. 583, 284 Pac. 950 (1930); Nordlund v. Nordlund, 97 Wash. 475,
166 Pac. 795 (1917); Campbell v. Campbell, 149 Mich. 147, 112 N.W. 481
(1907). As to constructive desertion or abandonment, see Evans v. Evans, 247
Ky. 1, 56 S.W. 2d 547 (1933); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 224 Ky. 668, 6 S.W. 2d
1078 (1928); Axton v. Axton, 182 Ky. 286, 206 S.W. 480 (1918).

1 MADDEN,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PEnSONS AND DoMEsTc RELATIONS,

269 (1931).
" Supra note 15 at 280.
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case of Griffin v. United States.' The defendant claimed that he had
acted in self-defense. He testified that deceased "jumped up and
started around the table, with his hand in his pocket, and told me he
would kick my teeth out of my head.'- 2 Five eye-witnesses testified
that the victim had not moved and that defendant was the aggressor.
It was admitted by defendant that he saw nothing in the hand of the
deceased at the time the shot was fired. The defendant was convicted
of murder in the first degree and sentenced to die. However, one
month before execution a motion for a new trial was made on grounds
of newly discovered evidence. It developed that a morgue attendant
had found an open penknife in the trouser pocket of the deceased.
The prosecutor had been informed of this fact, but not the accused.
A new trial was refused and certiorari was requested of the Supreme
Court, 3 which remanded to the Circuit Court of the District of
Columbia because that court failed to set out any rule in relation to
this basis for appeal. On remand, the circuit court decided that the
problem resolved itself into these two questions: (1) Are uncommunicated threats of a deceased person admissible to support a claim
of self-defense; and, (2) if the first question is to be answered in the
affirmative, should a new trial be granted? Having decided that such
threats should be admissible, the court set out the following rule:
"When a defendant claims self-defense and there is substantial
evidence, though it be only his own testimony, that the deceased attacked him, evidence of uncommunicated threats of the deceased
against the defendant is admissible."'

Probably the earliest statement of any rule concerning uncommunicated threats was that such threats were inadmissible." The
argument made was simply that such threats could not have influenced the actions of the defendant since he was unaware of them as
threats until some later time. 6 However logical such reasoning may
have been where the only question was whether the defendant had a
right to act on appearance alone, the courts refused to apply it to a
situation where there was evidence of aggression by the deceased.7
The general rule which was established in that situation is probably
best set out by Professor Wigmore,8 as follows:
1183 F. 2d 990 (C.C.A. D.C. 1950).
2

Griffin v. United States, 336 U. S. 704, 706 (1949).
Id. at 706.
'Supra
note I at 992.
5
Carrol v. State, 23 Ala. 28, 58 Am. Dec. 282 (1853).
'Trapp v. Territory of New Mexico, 225 Fed. 968 (C.C.A. 8th 1915).
3

SState v. Davis, Mo. -,
225 S.W. 707 (1920).
WiGoMo,
EVIDENcE sec. 110 (3rd ed. 1940). Contra: Gathers v. States,

'I

129 Fla. 758, 176 So. 771 (1937).

NoTxs ANm CommiiaNrs
"Where on a charge of homicide the excuse is self-defense, and
the controversy is whether the deceased was the aggressor, the
deceased's threats against the accused are relevant."'

Admissibility, even under the above rule, is made contingent upon
two strict limitations: (1) there must be no clear evidence that defendant was the aggressor; and, (2) there must be some evidence of
aggression by the deceased other than the uncommunicated threat
alone. 10
Where the above two conditions are satisfied perhaps it is logical
that the uncommunicated threat should be admissible. A requirement
in the admission of any evidence is that it be relevant to the issues at
hand." It is said that any evidence is relevant if "there is a logical
or rational connection between the fact which is sought to be proved
and a matter of fact which has been made an issue of the case."' 2 The
threat itself cannot be evidence of an act, and for this reason it is not
sufficient to raise an issue of self-defense. Furthermore, where there
is insufficient evidence to raise the issue of aggression by the deceased,
threats by the deceased are complefly irrelevant. As has been pointed
out, the courts have generally felt that if there is any evidence that
deceased was the aggressor the evidence of the the threat is relevant
and admissible, since it indicates there was predisposition on the
part of the deceased to be the aggressor. 13 Insofar as the problem of
relevancy is concerned, the majority decision in the Griffin case is
probably sound.
A further examination of the doctrine of uncommunicated threats
tends to cast some doubt upon the soundness of the decision, at least
at first glance. By applying the two mentioned limitations to admissibility, the courts in effect "weigh" the evidence that the defendant
was or was not the aggressor.' 4 The majority of the court in the
'Id. at 546. The use of such evidence is explained by I JoNrs EVIDENCE 257
(4th ed.) 1938, where it is stated: "Evidence of communicated threats is intended
to shed light upon the mental attitude of the prisoner toward the deceased when
homicide occurred: Uncommunicated threats are evidence of the mental attitude
of the deceased toward the prisoner." (Italics writer's)
2 Supra note 8 at 552. ,
UThe words "relevancy" and "admissibility" are not synonymous and should
be carefully distinguished. In order to be "admissible" evidence must be "relevant",
but the facts that evidence is "relevant" will not necessarily bring it within the
rule of "admissibility."
I JoNxs, EVIDENcE 238 (4th ed. 1938).
" Courts have been rather general in stating their reasons for admitting uncommunicated threats. For example, see Wiggons v. Utah, 93 U. S. 465 (1876),
(". . . recent threats may become relevant to show that this attitude was one
hostile to the defendant. . ."); Miller v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 818, 823, 45 S.W.
2d 405, 407 (1930.) (It was said that such threats may throw light on the conduct
of the deceased at the time of the homicide.)
" The "weight" to be given evidence is ordinarly for the jury to decide.
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Griffin case, while apparently adhering to this weight of evidence
peculiarity, has gone farther than any other case which could be
found, in holding that the unsupported testimony of the defendant
that deceased was the aggressor, contradicted by five eye witnesses,
nevertheless made the evidence of the uncommunicated threat admissible. 15 While it is true that the defendant has a right to testify for
himself, and that the credibility of his testimony is for the jury to
decide, nevertheless the court has, to say the least, greatly extended
the doctrine involved beyond its previous accepted limits. 16
Not only did the majority in the Griffin case expand the doctrine of
uncommunicated threats by the credibility it gave to the testimony of

the defendant alone, as against clear contradictory evidence, but it
also extended the doctrine in another manner. An uncommunicated
threat is ordinarily thought of as a clear verbal expression to a third
person of an intent to harm some other personyt In the Griffin case,
not only was the ordinary verbal threat completely lacking, but the
non-verbal threat (open pen-knife in the pocket of deceased) was not
communicated to anyone. Apparently this is the first case where a
concealed weapon has been held to be an uncommunicated threat.'8

'For example, see Commonwealth v. Tynell, 296 Pa. 332, 145 Atl. 855
(1929) (Defendant shot deceased in front of numerous persons in a church.
Many of these people testified that the deceased was not the aggressor. In refusing
to reverse on the grounds of failure to admit evidence of uncommunicated threats,
the court said: "So far as the admissibility of the uncommunicated threats to show
the slain man's state of mind is concerned, they could only come in under this
cover if it was shown that his actions at the time were those of hostility or aggression toward the killer, and nothing of the kind appears"); State v. Barber, 13
Idaho 65, 88 Pac. 418 (1907) (The defendant claimed self-defense and gave supporting testimony in his own behalf. The court said: "There were a number of
eye witnesses ... they do not differ materially as to any of the facts, hence no
uncommunicated threats would aid the jury to determine who was the aggressor");
State v. De Pass, 45 La. Ann. 1151, 14 So. 77 (1893) (Three defendants and two
eye witnesses testified that the deceased was the aggressor. Several disinterested
eye-witnesses contradicted this testimony. The court held that evidence of uncommunicated threats was not admissible, saying: "Taking the testimony as a
whole... we do not think it can be said there was testimony legally tending to
show a case of self-defense".)
" The "clear evidence" limitation is negatived simply by the defendant taking
the stand and testifying that the deceased was the aggressor. The courts have been
reluctant to be this lenient in applying the doctrine. However, the court may be
on firm ground, for if a defendant's testimony can support a jury verdict, then it is
arguable that it should be admitted in the Griffin case.
" Judge Clark, in his vigorous dissenting opinion in the Gffin case states:
"The classic example is where A applied to B to borrow a gun andstated that he
intended to kill C before night."
It is rather interesting to examine the reasoning used by the majority in
deciding that the Supreme Court language specifically makes this concealed
weapon an uncommunicated threat. On page 992 of the majority opinion it is said:
"By directing us to adopt and apply some rule on this subject the Court (Supreme
Court) determined only that the subject is before us; in other words that the
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There is little basis for objection to this, for a non-verbal threat may
tend to be explanatory of the deceased's actions just like any other
threat.19
It is a well established exception to the hearsay rule that any
statements which tend to show the state of mind of a person are admissible, if the state of mind is relevant to the issue at hand.20 The
theory behind this exception is that the statement illustrates an
attitude or state of mind from which another fact can be inferred,
in this case the fact of aggression by the deceased. The courts, however, in formulating the doctrine mentioned earlier, have seen fit to
ignore any reference to the hearsay rule and its exceptions. It is apparent that any attempt to obtain admissibility of these threats of the
deceased as an exception to the hearsay rule would be of dubious
value. This would be especially true in a situation like that presented
in the Griffin case, since the type of threat there does not even fit the
21
definition of hearsay.
It is entirely possible that the court in the Griffin case, was induced
by the language of the Supreme Court to approach the problem from
the angle of uncommunicated threats, and thereby completely overlooked a sound basis for admitting the evidence of the open penknife.
Jones states:
"In criminal prosecutions, it is familiar practice to show to the
jury articles or objects which tend to elucidate or explain the issues
or establish material facts."' (Italics writer's)

It would appear that the open penknife was real evidence tending
to establish a material fact, that is, that the deceased, at the time he
was shot, was predisposed to do battle with the defendant. Apparently
this point was never raised by counsel, but should a situation similar
to the Griffin case arise in the future, it is suggested the question of
real evidence should be made an issue. On that basis alone it is possible that admissibility would be assured.
In the final analysis it can be said that the limitations upon the
doctrine of uncommunicated threats are grounded in two basic fears:
(1) that the jury is not capable of evaluating this evidence properly:
evidence to be ruled upon is evidence of an uncommunicated threat. Because the
Court determined this latter question we do not discuss it."
Compare this with the language in the dissenting opinion of Judge Clark on
page 994.
"So long as uncommunicated threats are to be admitted at all, the non-verbal
threat seems no more objectionable than the verbal type. Proof is the major
problem.
oMcKELvERY, EvmIENCE 279 (4th ed. 1932).
' Hearsay may be generally defined as statements, oral or written, made by
one who is not now before the court and thus not subject to cross-examination.
" II JoNqus, EVIDENcE 754 (4th ed. 1938).
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This seems to be indicated by the limitation that there must be
"some other evidence of an aggression by the deceased," and, (2) that
this type of evidence is easily fabricated. 23 In view of these fears, and
the resulting limits placed upon the doctrine by the courts, will the
Griffin case have a marked effect upon future decisions? As has been
indicated, the decision clearly represents an extension of the rule
beyond the bounds heretofore contemplated by the courts. Its acceptance in the future is at least a matter open to serious question. It
is submitted that judge Clark was on firmer ground in his dissent when
he stated:
"It is indeed a far cry from this simple, logical doctrine entirely
based on self-defense to the rule announced by this court in the
present case which is without limit.""
CECIL WALDEN

INCOME TAX: OIL AND GAS LEASES AS CAPITAL ASSETS
In Petroleum Exploration v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,'
the issue before the court was whether the taxpayer had held a capital
asset for six months. On March 2, 1937, the taxpayer had taken an oil
and gas lease on certain lands. This lease was renewed February 23,
1938. On August 24, 1938 the taxpayer entered into an agreement
with another oil company whereby the latter agreed to drill a test
well on the leased premises. Pursuant to this agreement, a successful
oil well was completed on September 14, 1938. Within a short time
five more wells were also located on the properties. On January S1,
1939, the lease was sold to a third oil company for a considerable sum
of money. The operating equipment which was on the property was
also included in the sale. Following disputes between the taxpayer
and the commissioner, the Tax Court held that what the taxpayer sold
on January 31, 1939, was a capital asset held by the taxpayer since the
execution of the lease on March 2, 1937. The gain realized on the sale
was therefore a long term capital gain.2 On appeal, the circuit court
of appeals3 reversed the Tax Court's decision by holding that what
the taxpayer sold on January 31, 1939, was not the bare lease which
'I

WirmoRE, EvIDENCE sec.

111 at 552 (3rd ed. 1930).

"Supra note 1 at 995.
1193 F. 2d 59 (4th Cir. 1951).
'16 T. C. 277 (1951).
8
Supra note 1.

